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Abstract
We consider a Stackelberg type symmetric dynamic three-players zero-sum game. One
player is the leader and two players are followers. All players have the symmetric payoﬀ
functions. The game is a two-stages game. In the ﬁrst stage the leader determines the
value of its strategic variable. In the second stage the followers determine the values of
their strategic variables given the value of the leader’s strategic variable. On the other
hand, in the static game all players simultaneously determine the values of their strategic
variable. We do not assume diﬀerentiability of players’ payoﬀ functions. We show that
the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg type symmetric dynamic zero-sum
game with a leader and two followers is equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game if
and only if the game is fully symmetric.
Keywords: symmetric zero-sum game, Stackelberg equilibrium, leader, follower.
1 Introduction
It is well known that the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and that of the
static game are equivalent in a two-person zero-sum game. See, for example, Korzhyk et. al.
(2014), Ponssard and Zamir (1973), Tanaka (2014) and Yin et. al. (2010). We examine this
problem in a three-players zero-sum game, and show that the equilibrium of the Stackelberg
type dynamic zero-sum game and that of the static zero-sum game are equivalent if and only if
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the game is fully symmetric. We do not assume diﬀerentiability of players’ payoﬀ functions1.
However, we do not assume that the payoﬀ functions are not diﬀerentiable. We do not use
diﬀerentiability of payoﬀ functions.
In the next section we show the main result. All players have symmetric payoﬀ functions.
One player is the leader and two players are followers. The game is a two-stages game as
follows;
1. In the ﬁrst stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. In the second stage the followers determine the values of their strategic variables given
the value of the leader’s strategic variable.
On the other hand, in the static game all players simultaneously determine the values of their
strategic variables. We show that if the game is fully symmetric, the equilibrium of the
Stackelberg type dynamic game and that of the static game are equivalent.
As we will show in Section 3 using a model of relative proﬁt maximization in an oligopoly,
the Stackelberg equilibrium is not equivalent to the static (Cournot) equilibrium in the following
cases which are not fully symmetric.
1. All ﬁrms are asymmetric, that is, they have diﬀerent cost functions.
2. Two followers are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions.
3. The leader and one follower are symmetric.
If and only if all ﬁrms are symmetric, that is, they have the same cost functions, the Stackelberg
equilibrium is equivalent to the static (Cournot) equilibrium.
2 Symmetric dynamic zero-sum game
There is a three-players and two-stages game. Players are called Player 1, Player 2 and Player
3. The strategic variable of Player i is si ; i 2 f1; 2; 3g . The set of strategic variable of Player
i is Si ; i 2 f1; 2; 3g, which is a convex and compact set of a linear topological space. One of
players is the leader and other players are followers.
The structure of the game is as follows.
1. The ﬁrst stage
The leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. The second stage
Followers determine the values of their strategic variables given the value of the leader’s
strategic variable.
1In Tanaka (2018) we analyzed a similar problem when payoﬀ functions of players are diﬀerentiable.
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Thus, the game is a Stackelberg type dynamic game. We investigate a sub-game perfect
equilibrium of this game.
On the other hand, there is a static game in which three players simultaneously determine
the values of their strategic variables.
The payoﬀ of Player i is denoted byui.s1; s2; s3/. ui is jointly continuous in si and sj ; j ¤ i .
We assume
nX
iD1
ui.s1; s2; s3/ D 0 given .s1; s2; s3/:
Therefore, the game is a zero-sum game.
We do not assume diﬀerentiability of players’ payoﬀ functions2. We also assume that the
game is symmetric in the sense that the payoﬀ functions of all players are symmetric, and
assume that the sets of strategic variables for all players are the same. Denote them by S .
We show the following theorem
Theorem 1. The sub-game perfect equilibrium of the symmetric Stackelberg type dynamic
zero-sum game with a leader and two followers is equivalent to the equilibrium of the static
game.
Proof. (1) Suppose that the leader is Player 1. Let .s2.s1/; s3.s1// be a solution of the
following equation; (
s2.s1/ D argmaxs22S u2.s1; s2; s3.s1//
s3.s1/ D argmaxs32S u3.s1; s2.s1/; s3/;
given s1. Assume that argmaxs22S u2.s1; s2; s3.s1// and argmaxs32S u3.s1; s2.s1/; s3/
are unique. .s2.s1/; s3.s1// is a ﬁxed point of a function of .s; s0/ from S  S to S  S ;
argmaxs22S u2.s1; s2; s0/
argmaxs32S u3.s1; s; s3/

;
given s1. Since S is compact, u2.s1; s2; s3/ and u3.s1; s2; s3/ are jointly continuous, by
the maximum theorem s2.s1/ is continuous. We have
max
s22S
u2.s1; s2; s3.s1// D u2.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1//;
and
max
s32S
u3.s1; s2.s1/; s3/ D u3.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1//:
By symmetry of the game
s2.s1/ D s3.s1/;
and
u2.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1// D u3.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1//;
2As we said in the introduction, we do not assume that the payoﬀ function is not diﬀerentiable. We do not use
diﬀerentiability of payoﬀ functions.
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given s1. s1.s2/, s1.s3/, s2.s3/ and s2.s3/ are similarly deﬁned, and by symmetry of the
game we have
s1.s2/ D s3.s2/; s1.s3/ D s2.s3/:
s2.s1/ is also obtained as a ﬁxed point of the following function
max
s2S
u2.s1; s; s2.s1//:
(2) The Nash equilibrium of the static game is obtained as a ﬁxed point of a function of
.s; s0; s00/ from S  S  S to S  S  S ;0@argmaxs12S u1.s1; s0; s00/argmaxs22S u2.s; s2; s00/
argmaxs32S u3.s; s0; s3/
1A :
By symmetry of the game for all players we assume that s1 D s2 D s3 at the equilibrium.
Denote the equilibrium by .Qs; Qs; Qs/. Qs is also obtained as a ﬁxed point of the following
function.
max
s2S
u1.s; Qs; Qs/:
We assume uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the static game. At the equilibrium
of the static game .Qs; Qs; Qs/, we have
u1.Qs; Qs; Qs/ > u1.s; Qs; Qs/ for any s 2 S; s ¤ Qs; (1)
and
u1.Qs; Qs; Qs/ D 0:
Similarly,
u2.Qs; Qs; Qs/ > u2.Qs; s; Qs/ for any s 2 S; s ¤ Qs;
u3.Qs; Qs; Qs/ > u3.Qs; Qs; s/ for any s 2 S; s ¤ Qs;
and
u2.Qs; Qs; Qs/ D u3.Qs; Qs; Qs/ D 0:
Note that
s2.Qs/ D argmax
s22S
u2.Qs; s2; Qs/ D Qs:
Since the game is zero-sum and symmetric for Players 2 and 3, we have
u1.s; Qs; Qs/ D  2u2.s; Qs; Qs/:
Thus, (1) means
u2.s; Qs; Qs/ > 0:
By symmetry for Players 1 and 2, we get
u1.Qs; s; Qs/ > 0:
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Therefore,
u1.s; Qs; Qs/ < 0 < u1.Qs; s; Qs/: (2)
Similarly,
u1.s; Qs; Qs/ < 0 < u1.Qs; Qs; s/: (3)
Also we have
ju1.s; Qs; Qs/j D 2ju1.Qs; s; Qs/j D 2ju1.Qs; s; Qs/j: (4)
(3) The equilibrium strategy of Player 1 in the dynamic game is written as
argmax
s12S
u1.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1//:
Let
s1 D argmax
s12S
u1.s1; s2.s1/; s3.s1//:
.s1 ; s2.s1 /; s3.s1 // is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the dynamic game when Player 1 is
the leader. We assume uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Similarly, we get s2
and s3 such that
s2 D argmax
s22S
u2.s1.s2/; s2; s3.s2//;
and
s3 D argmax
s32S
u3.s1.s3/; s2.s3/; s3/:
s2 (s3 ) is the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy of Player 2 (Player 3) if he is the leader.
By symmetry of the game
s1 D s2 D s3 :
Denote them by s.
(4) Since, by symmetry for Players 2 and 3, s3.s/ D s2.s/ for any s, we have
s D argmax
s2S
u1.s; s2.s/; s2.s//:
This is equivalent to
u1.s
; s2.s/; s2.s// > u1.s; s2.s/; s2.s// for any s 2 S; s ¤ s:
Suppose a state such that s1 D s2 D s3 D Qs. From (2) and (3), for s ¤ Qs,
u1.s; Qs; Qs/ < 0; u1.Qs; s; Qs/ > 0; u1.Qs; Qs; s/ > 0:
Since u1.s1; s2; s3/ is jointly continuous, there exists a neighborhood V 0.Qs/ of Qs such
that, for s0 2 V 0.Qs/; s0 ¤ Qs
ju1.Qs; s0; s0/j < ju1.Qs; s; Qs/j;
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and
u1.Qs; s0; s0/ > 0;
for s which satisﬁes (2) and (3). Since the game is zero-sum,
u1.Qs; s0; s0/C u2.Qs; s0; s0/C u3.Qs; s0; s0/ D 0:
By symmetry
u1.Qs; s0; s0/ D  2u2.Qs; s0; s0/ D  2u1.s0; Qs; s0/:
Thus,
u1.s
0; Qs; s0/ < 0; u1.s0; s0; Qs/ < 0:
Also we have
ju1.Qs; s0; s0/j D 2ju1.s0; Qs; s0/j D 2ju1.s0; s0; Qs/j:
Since u1.s1; s2; s3/ is jointly continuous, if V.Qs/ is suﬃciently small, we can assume
ju1.Qs; s0; s0/   u1.Qs; Qs; Qs/j  2ju1.Qs; s0; Qs/   u1.Qs; Qs; Qs/j:
or
ju1.Qs; s0; s0/j  2ju1.Qs; s0; Qs/j:
Consequently, from (4)
ju1.Qs; s0; s0/j  ju1.s0; Qs; Qs/j:
Then, there exists a neighborhood V.Qs/ of Qs such that for s 2 V.Qs/
ju1.s; s2.s/; s2.s//j < ju1.s0; Qs; Qs/j; for s0 2 V 0.Qs/:
It seems to be that
js2.s/   Qsj < js   Qsj:
Since
u1.s; Qs; Qs/ < 0;
and
u1.Qs; s2.s/; s2.s// > 0;
we get
u1.s; s2.s/; s2.s// < 0:
This means
u1.Qs; Qs; Qs/ > u1.s; s2.s/; s2.s//; for s 2 V.s/:
Thus, .Qs; Qs; Qs/ is the Stackelberg equilibrium.
We have completed the proof.
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3 Example: relative profit maximization in a
Stackelberg oligopoly
3.1 Case 1: three firms are different each other
Consider a three ﬁrms Stackelberg oligopoly with a homogeneous good3. There are Firms A,
B and C. The outputs of the ﬁrms are xA, xB and xC . The price of the good is p. The inverse
demand function is
p D a   xA   xB   xC ; a > 0:
The cost functions of the ﬁrms are c2AxA, c2BxB and c2CxC . cA, cB and cC are positive
constants. We assume that cA, cB and cC are all diﬀerent. The relative proﬁt of Firm A is
'A D pxA   cAx2A  
1
2
.pxB   cBx2B C pxC   cCx2C /:
The relative proﬁt of Firm B is
'B D pxB   cBx2B  
1
2
.pxA   cAx2A C pxC   cCx2C /:
The relative proﬁt of Firm C is
'C D pxC   cCx2C  
1
2
.pxA   cAx2A C pxB   cBx2B/:
The ﬁrms maximize their relative proﬁts. We see
'A C 'B C 'C D 0:
Thus, the game is a zero-sum game. Firm A is the leader and Firms B and C are followers.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game Firm A determines xA, and in the second stage Firms B and C
determine xB and xC given xA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a.4cB C 3/.4cC C 3/
32cAcBcC C 32cBcC C 32cAcC C 30cC C 32cAcB C 30cB C 30cA C 27;
xB D a.4cA C 3/.4cC C 3/
32cAcBcC C 32cBcC C 32cAcC C 30cC C 32cAcB C 30cB C 30cA C 27;
xC D a.4cA C 3/.4cB C 3/
32cAcBcC C 32cBcC C 32cAcC C 30cC C 32cAcB C 30cB C 30cA C 27:
3In this example payoﬀ functions are diﬀerentiable.
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Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 4a.4cB C 3/.4cC C 3/.4cBcC C 4cC C 4cB C 3/
A
;
xB D 2a.4cC C 3/.32cAcBcC C 24cBcC C 32cAcC C 21cC C 32cAcB C 21cB C 30cA C 18/
A
;
xC D 2a.4cB C 3/.32cAcBcC C 24cBcC C 32cAcC C 21cC C 32cAcB C 21cB C 30cA C 18/
A
;
where
A D512cAc2Bc2C C 512c2Bc2C C 1024cAcBc2C C 944cBc2C C 512cAc2C C 432c2C
C 1024cAc2BcC C 944c2BcC C 1984cAcBcC C 1680cBcC C 960cAcC C 747cC C 512cAc2B
C 432c2B C 960cAcB C 747cB C 450cA C 324:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
3.2 Case 2: the leader and one follower are symmetric
Assume cC D cA.
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a.4cB C 3/
8cAcB C 10cB C 8cA C 9;
xB D a.4cA C 3/
8cAcB C 10cB C 8cA C 9;
xC D a.4cB C 3/
8cAcB C 10cB C 8cA C 9:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 4a.4cA C 3/.4cB C 3/.4cAcB C 4cB C 4cA C 3/
B
;
xB D 2a.4cA C 3/.32c
2
AcB C 56cAcB C 21cB C 32c2A C 51cA C 18/
B
;
xC D 2a.4cB C 3/.32c
2
AcB C 56cAcB C 21cB C 32c2A C 51cA C 18/
B
;
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where
B D512c3Ac2B C 1536c2Ac2B C 1456cAc2B C 432c2B C 1024c3AcB C 2928c2AcB
C 2640cAcB C 747cB C 512c3A C 1392c2A C 1197cA C 324:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
3.3 Case 3: two followers are symmetric
Assume cC D cB .
Nash equilibrium of the static game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a.4cB C 3/
8cAcB C 8cB C 10cA C 9;
xB D a.4cA C 3/
8cAcB C 8cB C 10cA C 9;
xC D a.4cA C 3/
8cAcB C 8cB C 10cA C 9:
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2a.2cB C 1/.2cB C 3/
16cAc
2
B C 16c2B C 40cAcB C 35cB C 25cA C 18
;
xB D 2a.4cAcB C 3cB C 5cA C 3/
16cAc
2
B C 16c2B C 40cAcB C 35cB C 25cA C 18
;
xC D 2a.4cAcB C 3cB C 5cA C 3/
16cAc
2
B C 16c2B C 40cAcB C 35cB C 25cA C 18
:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are not equivalent.
3.4 Case 4: all firms are symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the static game
Assume cA D cB D cC .
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a
2cA C 3; xB D
a
2cA C 3; xC D
a
2cA C 3:
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Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a
2cA C 3; xB D
a
2cA C 3; xC D
a
2cA C 3:
TheNash equilibrium of the static game and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the dynamic
game are equivalent.
4 Concluding Remark
As we said in the introduction, the equivalence of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and the
static game in a two-players zero-sum game is a widely known result. But, this problem in a
multi-players case has not been analyzed. In this paper we have analyzed a three-players game.
In the future research we want to extend the analysis in this paper to more general n-players
zero-sum game.
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